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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Alan Wayne Wellard was a passenger in a vehicle during a traffic stop. He
initially consented to a search of his person, but he asserts that he revoked his consent
upon further discussion with the police. Despite Mr. Wellard’s revocation, the police
searched him, found a scale, and arrested him. Subsequent searches of his person
uncovered drugs and paraphernalia. Mr. Wellard moved to suppress the evidence from
the search. The district court denied the motion. Mr. Wellard then pled guilty to
possession of a controlled substance, reserving his right to appeal the district court’s
denial of his motion. Mr. Wellard now appeals from the district court’s judgment of
conviction, asserting the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
A Fort Hall police officer conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle for an expired
license tag. (R., pp.157–58.) The driver consented to a search of the vehicle.
(R., p.159.) Mr. Wellard was in the passenger seat. (R., p.158.) Mr. Wellard gave the
officer the name “James Marshall.” (R., p.158.) Another police officer, Bingham County
Deputy Lawrence Henrie, arrived on the scene and took over the stop. (R., p.158.)
Deputy Henrie asked Mr. Wellard to step out of the vehicle, and Mr. Wellard
complied. (R., p.159.) Deputy Henrie asked if he could pat Mr. Wellard down for
weapons, “anything illegal, or anything like that.” (R., p.159, 164; State’s Ex. 3, at
Wellard 2, 7:46–7:53.) Mr. Wellard answered, “Yeah.” (R., p.165; State’s Ex. 3, Wellard
2, 7:54–7:57.) Mr. Wellard turned to face the car with his hands on the vehicle.
(R., p.165.) Almost immediately, Mr. Wellard asked, “Well, why do you have to pat me
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down?” (R., p.165 (emphasis in original); State’s Ex. 3, Wellard 2, 7:57–7:59.)
Mr. Wellard was gesturing with his right hand, turning towards Deputy Henrie, while his
left hand remained on the vehicle. (R., p.165; State’s Ex. 1, 34:59–35:09.) Deputy
Henrie explained that he wanted to make sure Mr. Wellard did not have any weapons
because Deputy Henrie would be inside the vehicle. (R., p.165; State’s Ex. 3, Wellard 2,
8:00–8:03.) Mr. Wellard responded, “Oh, I don’t have any weapons.” (R., p.165; State’s
Ex. 3, Wellard 2, 8:03–8:06.) Mr. Wellard then turned back towards the vehicle, placed
his left hand back on vehicle, and shook his head “(as if to say ‘no’).” (R., p.165; State’s
Ex. 1, 35:10–36:12.) Deputy Henrie asked, “So you don’t mind,” and Mr. Wellard gave
no audible response. (R., p.165; State’s Ex. 3, Wellard 2, 8:04–8:05.) Deputy Henrie
then stated, “Alright. I just want to make sure,” and began the search. (R., p.165; State’s
Ex. 3, Wellard 2, 8:05–8:07.) Twenty seconds elapsed from the time Deputy Henrie
asked Mr. Wellard to step out of the vehicle until he began the search. (State’s Ex. 3,
Wellard 2, 7:46–8:06.)
While conducting the pat down search, Deputy Henrie pulled out of Mr. Wellard’s
pocket what Deputy Henrie said “looks like a camera.” (State’s Ex. 3, Wellard 2, 8:13–
8:30.) Mr. Wellard agreed it was a camera. (State’s Ex. 3, Wellard 2, 8:30–8:33.) As
Deputy Henrie began to open up the container, Mr. Wellard told him that it was actually
a set of scales. (State’s Ex. 3, Wellard 2, 8:30–8:41.) Deputy Henrie opened the
container, verifying it was a scale. (R., p.160; State’s Ex. 3, Wellard 2, 8:40–8:47.)
Deputy Henrie observed a small amount of crystal residue on top, which he believed to
be methamphetamine. (R., pp.160, 167.)
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Deputy Henrie arrested Mr. Wellard. (R., p.160.) Mr. Wellard then informed him
of his true name, outstanding warrants for his arrest in another county, and his
possession of marijuana and a pipe on his pocket. (R., p.160.) Deputy Henrie found
those items in his pocket. (R., p.160.) During his transport to the sheriff’s office,
Mr. Wellard informed Deputy Henrie that he had methamphetamine in the belt line of his
pants. (R., p.160.) Deputy Henrie found a baggie of methamphetamine in that area.
(R., p.160.)
The State filed a Criminal Complaint, alleging Mr. Wellard committed the crime of
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, a felony, in violation of
I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1). (R., pp.8–9.) Following a preliminary hearing, the magistrate bound
Mr. Wellard over to district court. (R., pp.35–36; see generally Tr. Vol. I,1 p.3, L.1–p.32,
L.4.) The State filed an Information charging Mr. Wellard with possession of a controlled
substance. (R., p.37.) The State later filed an Amended Information adding two
misdemeanor offenses for possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.56–
57.)
Mr. Wellard filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the
search of his person and his arrest. (R., pp.58, 62–66.) He argued that the search of his
person could not be justified as a lawful Terry2 frisk for weapons because there were
“no circumstances present” for Deputy Henrie to believe Mr. Wellard “was armed and
dangerous.” (R., p.64.) He also argued that he revoked his consent to the search of his

There are three transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains the
preliminary hearing transcript. The second, cited as Volume II, contains the suppression
hearing. The third, cited as Volume III, contains the entry of plea hearing and
sentencing hearing.
2 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
1
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person. (R., pp.64–65.) Finally, he argued there was no probable cause to arrest him for
the scale, and any statements made after the arrest must be suppressed. (R., p.65.)
Additionally, Mr. Wellard submitted an affidavit in support of his motion. (Aug. R., pp.1–
3.) The State argued Mr. Wellard did not revoke his consent the search. (R., p.71.) The
State also argued the evidence would have been inevitably discovered because
Mr. Wellard would have been arrested due to the outstanding warrants. (R., p.72.) The
district court held a hearing on Mr. Wellard’s motion. (R., p.78; see generally Tr. Vol. II,
p.4, L.1–p.15, L.14.) The district court took judicial notice of the preliminary hearing
transcript and admitted three videos of the traffic stop. (Tr. Vol. II, p.4, L.13–p.5, L.18.)
No witnesses were called, and the district court took the matter under advisement after
argument. (Tr. Vol. II, p.6, L.11–p.15, L.11.)
The district court issued a written order and later an amended order denying
Mr. Wellard’s motion. (R., pp.119–131, 156–168.) The district court identified the State’s
position as claiming Deputy Henrie’s search of Mr. Wellard was lawful due to
Mr. Wellard’s consent, as opposed to a Terry frisk for officer safety.3 (R., p.164.) The
district court determined Mr. Wellard consented to the search and did not revoke that
consent. (R., pp.164–67.) The district court also determined Deputy Henrie had
probable cause for the arrest. (R., p.167.) But the district court rejected the State’s
argument that the inevitable discovery doctrine provided an alternative means to justify
the search of Mr. Wellard. (R., pp.167–68.) The district court reasoned that the doctrine
would not apply if it had found Mr. Wellard’s consent was invalid or revoked.

The State’s Brief in Support of State’s Objection to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress
also did not argue Deputy Henrie’s search of Mr. Wellard was a lawful Terry frisk.
(R., pp.69–73.)
3
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(R., pp.167–68.) Nonetheless, the district court denied Mr. Wellard’s motion to suppress
because it concluded he did not revoke his consent to search. (R., p.168.)
The State and Mr. Wellard entered a plea agreement. (R., pp.179–81; Tr. Vol. III,
p.4, L.11–p.5, L.9.) Mr. Wellard pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance, and
the State dismissed the misdemeanor charges. (Tr. Vol. III, p.4, L.14–p.5, L.1, p.36,
Ls.15–16.) Mr. Wellard reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress. (Tr. Vol. III, p.16, Ls.3–12, p.18, L.14–p.20, L.7.) The district court
sentenced him to six years, with three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.
(R., pp.202–04; Tr. Vol. III, p.33, L.20–p.34, L.10.) Mr. Wellard filed a timely notice of
appeal from the district court’s judgment of conviction. (R., pp.206–07.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Wellard’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Wellard’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Even though he initially consented to the search, Mr. Wellard asserts that he

revoked his consent shortly thereafter. For this reason, Mr. Wellard contends the
warrantless search of his person was unlawful. Due to the unlawful search, the district
court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the initial search
before his arrest and the subsequent searches after his arrest.
B.

Standard Of Review
The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a

motion to suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012). “The Court accepts
the trial court’s findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Watts, 142
Idaho 230, 234 (2005). The Court exercises free review of “the trial court’s application of
constitutional principles to the facts found.” Danney, 153 Idaho at 408.
C.

The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Wellard’s Motion To Suppress Because
Mr. Wellard Revoked His Consent To Search
“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from

unreasonable search and seizure. A search and seizure, conducted without a warrant
issued on probable cause, is presumptively unreasonable.” State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho
791, 796 (2003) (citations omitted). Voluntary consent to a search is an exception to the
warrant requirement, however. State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 488 (2007); State v.
Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 97 (Ct. App. 2006). “It is the State’s burden to prove, by a
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preponderance of the evidence, that the consent was voluntary rather than the result of
duress or coercion, direct or implied.” Jaborra, 143 Idaho at 97.
Mr. Wellard does not challenge the district court’s determination that he initially
consented to the search of his person.4 (R., pp.159, 164, 165.) Thus, the issue on
appeal is whether Mr. Wellard revoked his consent.5
Consent may be revoked even if an individual first had voluntarily consented to
search. State v. Thorpe, 141 Idaho 151, 154 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho
693, 696 (Ct. App. 1999). “Inherent in the requirement that consent be voluntary is the
right of the person to withdraw that consent.” State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 643, 646
(2014). After an individual has revoked consent, a subsequent search by law
enforcement is no longer pursuant to the initially voluntary consent. Thorpe, 141 Idaho
at 154; see also Staatz, 132 Idaho at 696. The standard for measuring a revocation of
consent “is that of objective reasonableness, ‘what would the typical reasonable person
have understood by the exchange between the officer and the subject.’” Thorpe, 141
Idaho at 154 (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)); see also Staatz,
132 Idaho at 696.
Based on the exchange between Mr. Wellard and Deputy Henrie, a typical
reasonable person would have understood that Mr. Wellard revoked his consent. As
argued by Mr. Wellard below, Mr. Wellard “expressed hesitancy” to allow the search.

Mr. Wellard conceded in the district court that he initially consented to the search.
(R., pp.65, 164.)
5 The State cannot argue for the first time on appeal that the search was lawful as a
Terry frisk for weapons. The State has the burden to establish an exception to the
warrant requirement. See, e.g., State v. Westlake, 158 Idaho 817, 820 (Ct. App. 2015).
As found by the district court, the State did not raise the Terry frisk exception as a
justification for the warrantless search.
4
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(R., p.65.) He “did not feel like he could outright refuse to allow the search.” (R., p.65.)
Similarly, as provided in Mr. Wellard’s affidavit, Mr. Wellard
did not want to be searched but he did turn around and put his hands back
on the roof of the vehicle because he believed at that point Deputy Henrie
would search him regardless and he believed he would be cited for
resisting and obstructing if he did not comply at that point.
(Aug. R., p.2.) Further, Mr. Wellard’s body language was not clear: he turned toward the
vehicle, but also shook his head “no” and briefly threw his hands in the air. (State’s Ex.
1, 34:57–35:11.) In light of the facts, Mr. Wellard submits he revoked consent and
therefore the search of his person was unlawful. Thus, the district court erred by
denying his motion to suppress.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Wellard respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order
denying his motion to suppress and vacate its judgment of conviction.
DATED this 29th day of April, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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